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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is not in issue.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This case presents one novel issue under Utah law:

should

alimony be terminated where the ex-wife has received alimony for
22 years, is a self-sufficient professional, but the ex-husband has
the means to continue paying alimony?

Specifically, four issues

are presented for review:
(1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding
a change in plaintiff's circumstances and in terminating her
alimony after 22 years?
(2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
the plaintiff's petition for increased alimony?
(3) Did the trial court consider the plaintiff's needs,
her earning capacity and the defendant's ability to pay
alimony in arriving at its decision to terminate alimony? and,
(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing
to expand discovery of defendant's financial records where the
defendant had provided tax returns and financial statements
and had stipulated that he had the ability to continue to pay
alimony?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
This is a case in equity, and no statutes or rules are
directly determinative.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a judgment and order modifying a

divorce decree.
B.

Proceedings and Disposition
On October 16, 1986 the defendant husband petitioned the Third

Judicial District Court, Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, for modification
of the Decree of Divorce originally entered in 1965, Record page
5, (hereinafter "R."), by eliminating his alimony obligation.
19-22.

R.

The plaintiff answered and cross-petitioned for an order

increasing alimony. R. 61-69. The defendant thereafter moved for
summary judgment on plaintiff's second claim for relief, which
alleged fraud on the part of the defendant at the time of the
original decree more than 20 years ago.

The defendant also moved

for summary judgment on the plaintiff's fourth claim for relief,
in which

the

plaintiff

contended

that

she

was

entitled

to

compensation based on the Masters of Business Administration degree
conferred upon the defendant during the marriage of the parties.
R.

81-85.

By Order

dated May

18, 1987

the Court

granted

defendant's motion for summary judgment in defendant's favor as to
plaintiff's fraud claims1 and as to plaintiff's claims that she was
entitled

to

a portion

of

defendant's M.B.A. degree.

defendant's

income

resulting

from

R. 158. The plaintiff also moved for

1

Plaintiff does not appeal from the summary judgment entered
against her claims of fraud. Docketing Statement 4-5.
2

summary judgment, requesting that the husband's petition for
modification be dismissed on the grounds that plaintiff had a
continuing need for alimony.

Plaintiff's motion was denied.

R.

157, 162-63, 248.
Simultaneously with granting partial summary judgment for
defendant, the Court also sustained the defendant's objections to
plaintiff's discovery on the basis that such requests were onerous
and oppressive, in light of the defendant's production of federal
tax returns, financial statements and his stipulation that he was
financially able to pay any reasonable alimony award. R. 88, 159,
201-205.
Trial was held on January 15, 1988. R. 249.
1988

the

Court

orally

defendant's

petition

to

plaintiff's

petition

to

announced

its

terminate
increase

On January 20,

decision

alimony
alimony.

and
R.

granting

the

denying

the

250.

After

considering and granting in part some of the plaintiff's objections
to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
on February 29, 1988 entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment and Order terminating alimony.

R. 220-233, 247

at 25. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied by the Court.
R. 225-237, 247.
of appeal.
C.

On March 18, 1988 the plaintiff filed a notice

R. 239.

Statement of Facts
The relevant facts are not greatly in dispute.

William

Bridenbaugh, defendant, and Edrie A. Bridenbaugh, plaintiff, were
married on February 2, 1956.

R. 12.
3

At that time, both parties

had a bachelor's degree. The parties were divorced on December 8,
1965 after less than 10 years of marriage. R. 12. It appears from
the record that the net worth of the plaintiff resulting from the
Decree of Divorce consisted of a promissory note in the amount of
$9,772.00 together with 50 shares of Boise Cascade stock and some
insurance policies. R. 6-9.

This net worth was nominal compared

to plaintiff's present net worth of $221, 000.00.

The Decree and

Property Settlement Agreement dated December 2, 1965 and executed
by the parties and adopted by the Court, directed the defendant to
make child support payments until the parties' two daughters
reached the age of 21.

R. 9, 13.

Both daughters are now older

than 21 and are financially independent. R. 249 at 26. The Decree
also ordered the defendant to make alimony payments of $400.00 per
month to the plaintiff "until changed by law or order of this
Court."

R. 13. Defendant fully and faithfully complied with the

terms of the Decree by paying all required alimony and child
support payments.

R. 249 at 53-54.

In addition, he, assisted one

daughter who elected to attend college.
As

would

be

expected,

both

R. 249 at 13.

parties

have

experienced

substantial changes in their lives since their divorce 23 years
ago.

Immediately prior to the divorce the plaintiff was not

employed outside the home and she had no income.

R. 249 at 15.

At the time of the divorce, she was raising two small children R.
249 at 12-15.
The plaintiff did not, immediately following entry of the
judgment and decree of divorce, obtain employment.
4

R. 249 at 15.

Rather, she returned to the University of Utah and obtained a
masters degree in social work in 1969.

R. 249 at 15-16.

She

commenced working outside the home in 1969 and was employed by the
Granite School District in 1974--some 14 years ago—where she still
works in the field of her education.

R. 249 at 15-18.

Since the divorce in 1965, plaintiff's overall financial
situation changed from that of a housewife with a B.S. degree and
young children, unemployed outside the home, R. 249 at 15, to an
economically independent, full-time professional student counselor
with a masters degree who has been employed by the Granite School
District for more than 14 years.
In 1987 plaintiff had a gross income from her part-time
employment of approximately $15,762. R. 249 at 19-20. Her 15-year
tenure

with

benefits.

the School

District

entitles

her

to

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, R. 249 at 47.

retirement
She owns a

condominium and a mountain resort home, an automobile, and stocks.
She testified at trial that her net worth was approximately
$221,000.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.

R. 249 at 24.

Defendant remarried after the divorce and is the father of
twin daughters by his second marriage.

R. 129, 249 at 54.

The

defendant has advanced steadily in the business world since the
divorce. His income and net worth are substantially more than they
were in 1965. R. 249 at 54-55. Defendant testified that his base
salary for 1986 was $240,000 and that his income for the calendar
year 1986 is eight times greater than his income during the
calendar year in which the Judgment and Decree of Divorce was
5

entered (1965).

He also acknowledged that his net worth in 1986

($2,908,400) was approximately 44 times greater than his net worth
in 1965.

R. 249 at 55, 70-71, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

The

defendant in his pleadings and during all proceedings acknowledged
that his application for elimination of alimony was not based on
his

circumstances

circumstances.

but

upon

the

change

in

the

plaintiff's

R. 20, 249 at 3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The plaintiff's circumstances changed substantially after the
parties divorced 22 years ago.

Her acquisition of a masters

degree, stable employment and an increase in her net worth of more
than $200,000 are changes that clearly justify modification of the
divorce decree.
Alimony should not be an annuity.

The trial court did not

abuse its discretion by terminating alimony after 22 years, even
though the defendant had the means to continue paying alimony.
The trial court properly considered all the relevant factors
in deciding to terminate alimony.

Finally, the trial court

properly denied the plaintiff's unnecessary and burdensome pretrial
discovery.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

standard

of

review

consideration for this Court.

is

an

important

preliminary

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

An award of alimony, or modification thereof,
is within the sound discretion of the Court,
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings of the Court, or there has been a
6

misapplication of the law, or the Court has
clearly abused its discretion.
Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147, 149 (Utah 1979) [citations omitted].
A more recent case held:
While we may review both the facts and the law
in matters of equity, we also accord
considerable deference to the judgment of the
trial court and treat its findings with a
presumption of validity.
King v. King, 717 P. 2d 715-16

(Utah 1986).

Applying those

standards to the facts of this case mandates affirmance of the
Judgment and Order of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING A CHANGE IN THE PLAINTIFF'S CIRCUMSTANCES
AND IN MODIFYING THE DECREE BY TERMINATING ALIMONY.
A.

Change in Circumstances
The plaintiff contends that there was insufficient evidence

to

support

the

Court's

finding

of

a change

of

plaintiff's

circumstances justifying a modification of the divorce decree.
(Brief

of

the Appellant, hereinafter

"Brief", pages

12-16).

Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, ample evidence shows that a
substantial change in plaintiff's circumstances had taken place
since the divorce, justifying modification of the divorce decree.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that financial
change affecting either spouse is an appropriate reason to modify
a divorce decree. Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P. 2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982);
Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984); King v. King, 27

7

Utah 2d 303, 495 P.2d 823 (1972).

In Haslam v. Haslam, the Utah

Supreme Court stated:
With respect to modifying alimony, this
Court has recently stated that 'provisions in
the original decree of divorce granting
alimony, child support, and the like must be
readily susceptible to alteration at a later
date, as the need which such provisions were
designed to fill are subject to rapid and
unpredictable change.'
Foulger v. Foulger,
Utah, 626 P.2d 412 (1981).
On the instant facts it is clear that
there has been a substantial change of
circumstances. Since the divorce, the former
Mrs.
Haslam
has
obtained
employment,
experienced a substantial increase in income
and has accumulated some savings.
657 P.2d at 758.
Similarly, in Jeppson v. Jeppson, the Supreme Court upheld a
trial court's finding of change in circumstances, stating:
A relative change in the income and expenses
of the parties, if comparatively
significant, can amount to a substantial
change in circumstances.
648 P.2d at 70.
Plaintiff quotes Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P. 2d 707, 710 (Utah
1985), arguing that defendant failed to carry his burden of showing
a substantial change of plaintiff's circumstances justifying a
modification of the divorce decree. (Brief, 12). Actually, Naylor
held that a change in income and the increased age of the parties'

8

children was sufficient reason to modify a divorce decree.

700

P.2d at 710.2
Here, the plaintiff's earnings and the substantial increase
in her net worth clearly constitute a change in her circumstances
justifying modification of the 1965 decree.

At the time of the

entry of the decree, the plaintiff had no significant assets or net
worth and no earnings.

She was not employed outside the home and

was raising two small children.

At this time she is a highly

educated, self-sufficient, employed professional with an advanced
degree, a good professional income, a net worth of approximately
$221,000 and supporting no dependent children.

Such economic

improvements easily fall within the Utah standards for substantial
change of circumstances permitting modification of a divorce
decree.

It is irrational for the plaintiff to argue that no

substantial changes have occurred in her circumstances over the
past 22 years.
Plaintiff's contention that the Decree was not susceptible to
modification is fallacious.

(Brief, 18). The Decree specifically

states that alimony was to be paid "until changed . . . by order
of this Court."

R. 13.

2

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) is also cited by
the plaintiff in support of her argument that the trial court's
order was erroneous. (Brief, 12). Jones was not a modification
of a divorce decree, and is irrelevant to the change in
circumstances issue.
9

B.

The Purpose of Alimony
The issue of first impression for this Court is whether the

purposes of alimony have been fulfilled here by the defendant's
faithful

payment

of

alimony

for

22

years.

The

defendant

acknowledges that his income and net worth are such that he could
have continued paying to the plaintiff $400.00 or more per month
as

alimony.

Defendant

petitioned

to

terminate

his

alimony

obligations not because of financial hardship upon him, but because
it is simply inequitable to require an ex-husband to continue
paying alimony for more than 22 years to an ex-wife who has a
masters degree, who is and has been professionally employed for 15
years, and whose lifestyle is now much higher than the lifestyle
she enjoyed during the marriage and at the time of the divorce.
The purpose of alimony is, of course, at the heart of this
appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

The purpose of alimony is to enable the spouse who
receives alimony to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living that was enjoyed during the marriage.
Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court
has further held:
the purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife
and not to inflict punitive damages on the husband.
Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband
nor a reward to the wife....
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) (quoting 2 Nelson
Divorce and Annulment); see also Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84
(Utah App. 1987).

A key function of alimony is "to prevent the

wife from becoming a public charge." English v. English, 565 P.2d

10

at 411 (Utah 1977). Finally, the Utah courts have held that public
policy should encourage one receiving alimony to seek employment.
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah 1978).
C.

Alimony Is Not An Annuity.
Several Utah cases have held that -armination or reduction of

alimony is appropriate where the wife3 is economically able to
satisfy her needs. In Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976), the
Supreme Court reversed a trial courtf s refusal to reduce alimony
from $300 per month to $1.00 per year.

The former wife in Dehm,

like the plaintiff here, obtained a masters degree after entry of
the decree of divorce and secured gainful employment.

Id. at 528.

She also acquired equities and savings in the amount of $11,500.
The court held:
although an increase in the income of a
divorced wife does not, of itself, determine
a reduction in alimony; neither does an
increase in the income of a divorced husband,
of itself, determine the maintenance of
alimony.
* * *

In a situation such as this, where the
defendant [wife] is gainfully employed, making
a salary sufficient to satisfy her needs, is
adequately housed, and is in good health; one
of the functions of alimony is not to provide
retirement income. We do not want to
confuse

alimony with

annuity.

apparently, Utah does not have an appellate case involving
alimony awarded to a husband.
11

Id. at 528-29. [Emphasis added] Dehm parallels the facts here and
is controlling.
Defendant's alimony payments assisted the plaintiff to obtain
a masters degree that qualified the plaintiff for the professional
field in which she has worked since 1969.

R. 15.

The plaintiff,

as did the wife in Dehm, has achieved economic self-sufficiency
through her labor in graduate school and in the working world. She
has been employed by the same employer for 15 years and has no
dependent children to support. She has net worth of $221,000. Her
claims for continued alimony are premised on her ex-husband's postdivorce financial success and ability to pay, and not upon her own
economic need. To maintain defendant's alimony obligations beyond
22 years would be bestowing an annuity (until death) upon the
plaintiff—contrary to the holding in Dehm.
In Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984), the Supreme
Court affirmed the termination of alimony eight years after the
dissolution of marriage which had lasted ten years.

In Jeppson,

the wife was a college graduate who had worked as a legal secretary
and had various capital assets, including stocks and an incomeproducing

rental property.

In affirming

the termination of

alimony, the Supreme Court focused on the wife's economic situation
and held:
Even though Mrs. Jeppson's illness may prevent
her from achieving her highest earning
capacity, the trial court concluded that her
ability to perform some work, plus the assets
she has available to her, are sufficient for
her to support herself and that she is not in
danger of becoming a financial burden to the
12

public. On these facts, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.
Id. at 71.

See also, King v. King, 495 P.2d 823 (Utah 1972)

(termination of alimony proper where wife's health improved,
allowing her to work).
Plaintiff cites Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978)
(Brief, 15), arguing that terminating alimony would penalize the
plaintiff for her industriousness.

The parties in Carter were

divorced after 31 years of marriage, and the wife was 58 years old
when she reentered the labor force. Those facts are far different
than these, where the wife was 32 at the time of the divorce, and
within four years went to work after first obtaining a graduate
degree.
Plaintiff also cites Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978)
(Brief, 15), arguing that even if a wife is able to support
herself, alimony should continue if the husband has sufficient
resources to pay alimony.

Frank is easily distinguishable from

this case; first, because the parties in Frank had been married for
21 years; second, the husband in Frank was psychologically disabled
at the time of entry of the divorce, and although Frank is a
modification case, it really involved the initial imposition of
alimony after the husband had regained his health.

Id. at 454.

Plaintiff also cites Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah
App. 1988) (Brief, 17), arguing that disparity in income mandates
the maintenance of alimony. Rasband was an appeal from an initial
divorce decree, not the modification of a decree.

13

In Rasband,

unlike here, the parties had been married for 30 years at the date
of divorce, and the wife had devoted herself for those 30 years to
child rearing and not income-producing work. Id. at 1333. The exwife in Rasband had "no income," in contrast to the plaintiff's
situation here where she has had stable employment plus interest
and dividend income, and was married for nine years—not 30.
Plaintiff cites no case approaching these facts where the
marriage was of short duration, the ex-wife holds a graduate
degree, has had

stable employment for fifteen years, and has

received alimony for 22 years.

Dehm, Jeppson, and King are much

closer factually, and all support the trial court's Judgment and
Order.
Other jurisdictions have held that an ex-husband is not a
"life-long guarantor" of the ex-wife's standard of living.

Ward

v. Ward, 41 Or.App. 447, 599 P.2d 1150, 1153 (1979); Anderson v.
Anderson, 333 So.2d 484 (Fla.App. 1976) (alimony terminated even
though husband's income substantially more than ex-wife's income);
Lasota v. Lasota, 125 111. App. 3d. 37, 465 N.E.2d 649 (1984).
In addition to the precedent that supports the trial court's
judgment and order, public policy also favors an end to alimony
under these facts.

This is not a case where the wife worked her

husband through graduate school, only to be abandoned at the
graduation ceremony with neither a degree nor the income resulting
from the degree.

Nor is this a case where the parties were

divorced after a lengthy marriage and the wife compelled to start

14

a career late in life after devoting herself to rearing children
to adulthood.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR INCREASED ALIMONY.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by not increasing alimony or awarding equitable restitution to
compensate her for the sacrifices she made for the defendant while
he obtained his Master's of Business Administration degree more
than 30 years ago and prior to the entry of the decree of divorce
in this case.

(Brief, 26-28), R. 127-28.

Plaintiff cites Martinez

v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) (Brief, 26) as authority
for her position.
The trial court granted defendantf s motion for partial summary
judgment on this issue.

R. 152.

Even viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, as this Court must on review
of grant of summary judgment, Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283
(Utah App. 1987), plaintiff's claims to defendant's MBA are without
merit.
Martinez held that equitable restitution is appropriate
where divorce occurs shortly after the degree
is obtained [and] traditional alimony analysis
would often work hardship because, while both
spouses have modest incomes at the time of
divorce, the one is on the threshold of a
significant increase in earnings.
754 P.2d at 76 quoting Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 242
(Utah App. 1987).

The Martinez court further stated that:

The function of equitable restitution is to
share newly obtained earning capacity of a
15

former spouse who has achieved that capacity
through the significant efforts and sacrifices
of
the
requesting
spouse
which
were
detrimental to that spouse's development.
754 P.2d at 78.
In Martinez, the husband graduated from medical school and
began a low-paying internship in 1981, and the divoirce complaint
was filed in 1983.

754 P.2d at 71.

Here, by contrast, the

defendant graduated from business school in 1958 and the divorce
was filed in 1965.

R. 127-28; 17.

Mrs. Bridenbaugh enjoyed the

fruits of her ex-spousefs advanced degree for seven years prior to
divorce and for 22 years since the divorce.

Mr. Bridenbaugh's

graduate degree took two years to complete, not four years plus an
internship, as with the husband's degree in Martinez.

Further,

Martinez and its forebearers, Petersen, supra, Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238
(Utah App. 1987) were appeals of initial decrees of divorce, unlike
this case where the spouse has already received alimony for almost
half of her life and where the wife has herself obtained an
advanced degree.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED
THE PLAINTIFF'S NEEDS, HER EARNING CAPACITY, AND THE
DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY.
Much of the plaintiff's brief is devoted to challenging the
trial court's consideration of the plaintiff's need for alimony,
her earning capacity, and the defendant's ability to pay alimony.
(Brief, Points B, C, D ) .
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Plaintiff complains that the Court erred

in discounting

plaintiff's claimed expenses in determining her financial needs.
(Brief, 19).

Here, the trial court explicitly found that the

plaintiff's claims of monthly expenses for house maintenance, auto
depreciation

and

furniture repair were not supported

evidence. R. 229, paragraph 15; R. 247 at 6.

by any

Plaintiff testified

at trial that her costs for furniture repair and replacement were
$269.00 per month.

R. 249 at 51-52.

She also testified that her

automobile depreciated at a rate of $2,000.00 per year and that she
had house maintenance expenses of $112.50 per month.

The trial

judge has the duty to assess the demeanor and credibility of
witnesses, and here, the plaintiff's statements about her financial
needs were suspect.

The trial court was within its discretion in

disregarding her testimony.

Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431

P.2d 802, 803 (1967); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290,
293 (1962), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
Plaintiff and defendant elicited ample evidence concerning the
plaintiff's income and her financial needs through direct and
cross-examination.

R.

249

at

11-48.

Plaintiff's

evidence

concerning her financial needs was not credible, Findings of Fact
paragraph 15, R. 229; 247 at 6, but that does not mean that the
Court did not consider her needs in finding that alimony was no
longer necessary.

The evidence showed that the plaintiff had

professional employment and earnings, substantial assets, including
equity in a condominium, a resort cabin, stocks, money market funds
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and

personal

property.

Plaintiff's

Exhibit

5.

The

Court

considered plaintiff's needs in coming to its decision.
The plaintiff's earning capacity and employment history were
also considered by the Court after substantial evidence in the
record.

R. 228; 249 at 18, 40.

Plaintiff's assertions that the trial court did not adequately
consider the defendant's income and assets in terminating alimony
and in denying an alimony increase are without basis.

Defendant

did not deny that he had the income and assets to continue paying
alimony or to pay an increase in alimony, R. 88, 249 at 66, and
plaintiff spent much of trial in overkilling a point that was not
disputed.

R. 249 at 64-105. The trial court's statement that the

defendant's income was sufficient to allow him to pay any increase
in alimony indicates anything but

a lack of consideration by the

Court of the defendant's ability to pay alimony.

R. 249 at 66.

Simply because the trial court discouraged plaintiff's attempt to
introduce cumulative evidence does not mean the Court did not fully
consider defendant's ability to pay alimony.

In Matter of the

Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982), the court stated:
Counsel for the respondent stipulated that
Ruth had those financial resources [to pay off
a mortgage] and the judge in his summation of
the evidence at the conclusion of the trial
stated that he assumed that Ruth had enough
money to make those purchases on her own. In
light of the respondent's stipulation, the
trial court was properly within its discretion
in refusing to admit cumulative evidence.
655 P.2d at 1117. The defendant's ability to pay alimony was not
an issue that required extensive evidence.
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Plaintiff's

claims that the Court failed to consider the three factors outlined
in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), (Brief 12, 15-21, 2426), is without substance.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY REFUSING TO ORDER UNNECESSARY DISCOVERY
OF THE DEFENDANT'S FINANCES.
The Plaintiff appeals the trial court's limitations on his
requests for discovery of defendant's economic situation. (Brief,
21-23). However, the trial court's refusal to permit the plaintiff
to go on a fishing trip through the defendant' s records was
proper.4

The

defendant

produced

tax

returns

and

financial

statements and readily admitted that his financial resources would
enable him to continue paying alimony and, in fact, to pay any
reasonable increase in alimony that the court might order. R. 20,
88, 249 at 72-93.

Therefore, defendant's admission negated the

need for detailed discovery of the plaintiff's financial situation.
The trial court was certainly within its discretion to
determine that additional discovery was cumulative and
unnecessary based on the defendant's admission.

In State Road

Commission v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 381, 412 P.2d 914, 918 (1966) the
court stated:

4

Trial courts enjoy great discretion in handling pretrial
discovery, and their discovery orders are reversed only on a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.
See e.g., United
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1382
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Judge Scalia writing for the Court).
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The use of discovery should not be extended to
permit ferreting unduly into detail....nor
should it be distorted into a ' fishing
expedition1 in hope that something should be
uncovered.
It should be confined in the
proper limits of enabling the parties to find
out essential facts for its legitimate
objective....
In any event, the defendant produced a financial statement and tax
returns for the last two years which reasonably fulfilled the
plaintiff's legitimate discovery needs.

R. 201, 203-205.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision to terminate defendant's alimony
obligation was not erroneous, and should be affirmed by this Court.
The plaintiff has had 22 years since the divorce to regain her
footing.

Her advanced degree and stable professional employment

demonstrate

that she has

the means to provide

Maintenance of alimony here would

bestow

for herself.

an annuity

on the

plaintiff simply because her ex-husband has the ability to pay.
The trial court's rulings on compensation for defen- dant's
professional degree, an increase in alimony, and
discovery issues were not abuses of discretion and should be
A

upheld.

Respectfully submitted this / \Q day of September, 1988.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

(Jaines PM Cowley
William H. Christensen
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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